Disarmament in Times of War: Interview with Thomas Countryman

I think first about a broader term, which is arms control. The purpose of arms control is to reduce the probability, the severity, and the cost of military conflict. It should do that by mechanisms that prevent conflict from beginning, or prevent escalation of conflict from one form or one type of weapon to a higher type. It should provide communication channels for that de–escalation.

An important part of arms control are agreements that also limit the arsenals of potential military competitors. Throughout the history of the last sixty years, Washington and Moscow succeeded in reducing their arsenals substantially and in that way reducing the risk of conflict. At this point, further steps on disarmament are difficult to foresee in the very near future, but that does not mean that arms control cannot develop new agreements and new formats that will reduce the risk of these weapons being used.  Disarmament is one key, not the only, but perhaps the most important, aspect of arms control that aims to limit the risk and the severity of warfare.

Yes, I do, and I think that is important.  Future success in reaching new arms control understandings will build importantly upon the experience of the last sixty years.  Some of those key elements that I think have been recognized by every U.S. president, except the most recent one, include first of all an understanding that limiting the arsenal of a potential adversary is good for America’s security. 

Second, it is not a matter of weakness to speak to a potential rival. Rather, the U.S. should negotiate from a position of strength and should not be afraid to negotiate with any other country on any issue that touches American national security. 

Third, I think that every president has recognized that treaties are not something to be feared.  They may impose restrictions on American sovereignty, but they do so in a manner that imposes the same restrictions on others and that enhances America's security.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, every American president has recognized that reducing nuclear risk is an existential issue for the survival of our republic and of the world.  Therefore, we should continue to work to reduce that risk even when we are in a period of confrontation on other issues. 

This is the word that the Russians don’t like today: compartmentalization.  But the fact is that for more than sixty years the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia practiced compartmentalization.  When Soviet weapons were killing American soldiers in Vietnam, we continued to talk about nuclear arms control.  When American weapons were killing Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, we continued to talk about arms control. 

The fact that today the United States is supplying weapons that Ukraine is using to defend itself against invasion is not substantively different from the previous confrontations that we have faced.  It remains important to be able to discuss nuclear arms control even in this circumstance.  So I see much more continuity on the U.S. side.  What concerns me today is a different Russian attitude today that puts the existential risk of nuclear war as a lower concern than Mr. Putin’s success in Ukraine.

Let me add one more priority for the U.S.: All the important international agreements on arms control and nonproliferation, whether bilateral or multilateral, have required the United States to be active and to be a leader in formulating those treaties and initiating the relevant diplomatic processes.  American leadership is not the same thing as American dominance or American control of a process, but it remains absolutely crucial that the United States not simply say “we are ready to talk some more”, but to actively propose ideas for starting that conversation.

Each of those four cases is very different.  The TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) is an instrument that was negotiated among non–nuclear–weapon states.  I admire the initiative they took to say that we are not content to wait for the five nuclear powers to fulfill their obligation under the NPT (Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).  The rest of the world is ready to take steps to make that happen. Now, that said, like every other multilateral treaty, it has its flaws and its gaps.  For the United States, it is not at this time a meaningful path forward to nuclear disarmament.  So that’s one treaty.

The land mines treaty is more difficult.  The U.S. has contributed greatly to the process of demining and has limited the potential use of land mines to a very narrow circumstance involving a real–world military situation.  And that is the threat of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea.  But otherwise, it is a hard call because the U.S. has, I think, great sympathy for the goal of getting rid of land mines everywhere. Similarly, for cluster munitions, the United States has had a very narrow policy of not providing cluster munitions.  That was recently reversed at a moment of existential crisis for Ukraine, but otherwise the U.S. sympathizes with the goal. 

The arms trade treaty is different. I led the negotiation team for the U.S. on the arms trade treaty.  It is a treaty that has important humanitarian language. It does not create any obligation that the U.S. has not already fulfilled. In fact, much of the language is based upon the process of arms export control that the United States has pursued for more than sixty years. 

The problem with the ATT (Arms Trade Treaty) at the moment is purely internal American politics.  If you put the words “control” and “guns” and “United Nations” and “Democrats” all in one sentence, this is a powerful method for certain groups in the United States to raise money by stoking fear.  When you combine that with the dysfunction of the United States Congress today, there is no point in submitting it for ratification. But the fact is that, unlike a number of countries that have signed or ratified the treaty, the United States is already fully in compliance with the treaty, with all the steps outlined in the treaty. 

In general, the thing that these four have in common is that any treaty that requires ratification by the U.S. Senate, no matter how simple it is, that’s a difficult political proposition.  The more complex the treaty, and all four of these are complex, we do not currently have the kind of function we need to get a two–thirds ratification of anything in the U.S. Senate.

Well, those criticisms have some validity. Keep in mind that, during an arms race, no government will ever admit that it is arms racing.  Each will say “I did not start this; I am responding to what someone else has done in terms of a threat”.  That is certainly the official U.S. military point of view, that the nuclear modernization program is not adding to the arsenal, but it is sustaining the credibility of the deterrent. Naturally, Russia and China will all say the same thing.  The fact is, of course, that the rest of the world sees an arms race and it sees trillions of dollars being diverted from other human needs into nonproductive military capabilities.

The other point I would add is there is a great similarity among Russia, China, and the United States in one way.  All three of them have waged expansionist wars in their past and yet all three of them deny that they have ever started a war, or conquered other people, or sought imperial expansion.  Each of them has whitewashed its own history.  It is hard for all three of them to understand why smaller countries get nervous about the enormous military power that each of them builds.  So I think the three are driving militarization among each other.  I am not sure that they are driving militarization among the rest of the world.

In the very short term, I am pessimistic.  In the longer term, I am optimistic.  If we survive the next couple of years, I think that there will be other geopolitical developments that will not solve all problems but will make possible once again the kind of dialogue of mutual interest that Moscow and Washington pursued for so many years.

That is a tough question.  First let me say I admire the current Secretary General’s efforts to define the important steps in arms control and to constantly remind the world, in particular the nuclear armed states, of their responsibility and obligation to pursue disarmament.  That is a leadership role. In the United States we call it a bully pulpit and I think Gutierrez is using it well.  Structurally, it is difficult for the UN architecture to do as much as it could on the disarmament agenda.  I am encouraged by the fact that the Arms Trade Treaty, the TPNW, and the land mine treaty were negotiated through a United Nations framework.  The problem with each of those treaties – in particular the TPNW – is that you can negotiate something through the UN framework without necessarily getting the acceptance or the buy–in from the key actors. 

This is not the fault of the United Nations.  It is the fault of the actors.  But I think it is very important that people speak up, that every nation speak up at the United Nations and every venue to remind in particular the five nuclear–powered states that they should not be making nuclear threats and that they should be pursuing their non–proliferation treaty obligation.